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Empiricism has reigned supreme as an episteme for mainstream accounting research for some 25 years.
In accounting, the Empiricist doctrine has assumed various guises. Positive Accounting is one of
Empiricism's generic forms. It exists both in its own right, and in various incarnations such as Market
Studies, Agency Theory and Historical Archivalism (in accounting history). In the U.S, these
manifestations of Empiricism emerged in the mainstream literature in response to attacks on the then Big
8 accounting firms and their corporate clients. In the 1970's, Abraham Briloff's assaults in Barrons were
costing the firms and their clients millions of dollars in law suits. The Big 8 mounted a counterattack to
Briloff's normative perspective by alleging such work consisted of arbitrary 'opinions' and 'value
judgments'. The firms urged mainstream academe to develop an alternative to normative research,
grounded in 'objective' factual (empirical) analysis -- Positive Accounting Research. Archival accounting
history was a byproduct of this new regime. The result has been to deflect mainstream academia from
any critical mission and render it impotent in dealing with the massive audit and financial failures that
today imperil the World Wide economy. Positive Accounting's continuing presence has anesthetized
criticism by the Academy. This paper takes advantage of a rare opportunity to deploy a 'Crucial
Experiment' to evaluate accounting's positivistic epistemic foundations. This opening allows for an indepth review of Historical Archivalism (and therefore, by implication, its parents: Positivism and
Empiricism). This paper catalogues first, how archivalist accounting history disguises its normative
underpinnings, and second, explores the nature of these normative underpinnings. It reveals how archival
research 'disowns' value judgments by ‘Consulting an Oracle’: a technique of using other-voices to
camouflage opinions and normative stances. Implicit in this paper's critique of Archivalism is an
alternative episteme -- Post-Positivism or Constructionism -- that immerges as an alternative to
Archivalism. The paper concludes that the hidden agenda of Archivalism / Positivism is a politically
conservative one: a form of politics aimed at preserving a status quo.
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New Oracles from Delphi
A 'Crucial Experiment' for Positivism in Archival History
Abstract
Empiricism has reigned supreme as an episteme for mainstream
accounting research for some 25 years. In accounting, the Empiricist
doctrine has assumed various guises. Positive Accounting is one of
Empiricism's generic forms. It exists both in its own right, and in various
incarnations such as Market Studies, Agency Theory and Historical
Archivalism (in accounting history). In the U.S, these manifestations of
Empiricism emerged in the mainstream literature in response to attacks on
the then Big 8 accounting firms and their corporate clients. In the 1970's,
Abraham Briloff's assaults in Barrons were costing the firms and their
clients millions of dollars in law suits. The Big 8 mounted a counterattack
to Briloff's normative perspective by alleging such work consisted of
arbitrary 'opinions' and 'value judgments'. The firms urged mainstream
academe to develop an alternative to normative research, grounded in
'objective' factual (empirical) analysis -- Positive Accounting Research.
Archival accounting history was a byproduct of this new regime. The result
has been to deflect mainstream academia from any critical mission and
render it impotent in dealing with the massive audit and financial failures
that today imperil the World Wide economy. Positive Accounting's
continuing presence has anesthetized criticism by the Academy. This
paper takes advantage of a rare opportunity to deploy a 'Crucial
Experiment' to evaluate accounting's positivistic epistemic foundations.
This opening allows for an in-depth review of Historical Archivalism (and
therefore, by implication, its parents: Positivism and Empiricism). This
paper catalogues first, how archivalist accounting history disguises its
normative underpinnings, and second, explores the nature of these
normative underpinnings. It reveals how archival research 'disowns' value
judgments by ‘Consulting an Oracle’: a technique of using other-voices to

camouflage opinions and normative stances. Implicit in this paper's
critique of Archivalism is an alternative episteme -- Post-Positivism or
Constructionism -- that immerges as an alternative to Archivalism. The
paper concludes that the hidden agenda of Archivalism / Positivism is a
politically conservative one: a form of politics aimed at preserving a status
quo.

Archival Activism and the Poverty of Empiricism

1. METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW
The notion of crucial experiments ('experimentum crucis') was first
muted in the seventeenth century in Francis Bacon's Novum Organum, as
"instantia crucis". Bacon used this method for deciding which of two
competing theories of tidal movement were valid (Lakatos and Musgrave,
1970). Galileo deployed the same method in adjudicating between the
Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories of planetary movement (Kuhn, 1962,
1970). In the 20th century, a much celebrated 'experimentum crucis'
expedition, led by Arthur Eddington to Principe Island in Africa in 1919,
tested Newton's versus Einstein's theories of gravitation. Eddington found
that Einstein's General Theory of Relativity more accurately predicted the
positions of stars around the Sun during a solar eclipse.
This paper attempts to emulate a 'crucial experiment', however it is
tempered by the subsequent philosophical literature as to the feasibility of
such experiments (Ravetz, 1973, Allen, 1975, Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970).
Informed by this literature, this paper uses a combination of empirical and
argumentative material for adjudicating the validity of the truth-claims of
two competing theoretical systems. The two theoretical systems in
contention in this paper are Positivist Archivalism (sometimes represented
as Historical Archivalism or Empiricism) and Post-Positivism (or
Constructionist, or Post-Kuhnian analysis).1 Each represents a competing
approach to establishing theoretical and empirical truth. At the risk of
oversimplification, they differ in that Positivist Archivalism asserts that
facts and evidence alone are determinate in establishing the validity of a
1

To avoid repetition and cluttering the text with a lists, this paper will attempt to limit the
presentation to a single proxies such as "Positivism", "Post-Positivism" (and
"Archivalism)" and minimize the use of Empiricism, Constructionism, Post-Kuhnianism
and Historical Archivalism.

theory2, whereas for Post-Positivism, 'truth' is historical -- relative to time
and place. Thus while Positivistic Archivalism seek universal truths, PostPositivism contends that what was true in the times of, say, Socrates or
Keynes, may no longer be true today (Allen, 1975).3 Positivist Archivalism
seeks an invariant, absolute, yardstick of truth that pertains throughout
time and space. Post-Positivism, in contrast, regards truth as changeable -- a socio-historical artifact that is socially manufactured.
The classic tournament between these two philosophical systems is
documented in an engagement between Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyebend
and others in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) and subsequently between
Popper and Adorno in Frisby (1976). Modern Post-Positivistic Philosophy
is an outgrowth of these debates; it is sometimes termed Post-Kuhnian to
denote the importance of Kuhn in establishing the turning-point of the
primacy of History over Philosophy-- the triumph of historical truth over
philosophical or Absolute truth.
These issues are explicated in four sections of this paper: the first
section includes this Methodological Overview and an introductory
discussion entitled, "The Rise of Positivism in Accounting". This passage
traces the historical roots of Positivism and Positivist Archivalism in
accounting. The second and third sections offer an empirical and then a
theory-based Post-Positivist critique of Positivist Archivalism. These
sections draw on an important paper by Tyson and Oldroyd (2007) that
provides a very thorough presentation of the case supporting Positivistic
Archivalism. This juxtaposition of Tyson and Oldroyd's Positivist
Archivalism with a Post-Positivist perspective is our best approximation to
2

Accounting researchers have devoted reams of paper to attempting to define complex
terms like “income”, “wealth”, “expense” and “executive compensation”. The same
complexity applies to philosophical terms like “positivism”, “empiricism”, “normative”
and even “archivalism”. Rather than turn this paper into a long etymological quest, it
follows the convention of referring readers to references that define terms like Empiricism,
Positivism and Archivalism (c.f, Caldwell, 1982A, 1982B; Jones, 1972).
3
Keynesian fiscal policy may be said to be 'true' in its somewhat successful applications
in Post-WW11. But by 2009, the opening of national economies through trade dilutes the
impact of a national fiscal stimulus. In this specific sense, Keynesian is now 'dead' or
untrue in a historical sense (Allen, 1975, Held, 1980).

a 'crucial experiment'. The final Implications section reviews the results of
the previous analysis.

The Rise of Positivism in Accounting
Positivism has dominated mainstream accounting for some 25 years.
Positivism, in its various forms, began to dethrone normative accounting
research in the mid-nineteen seventies. Even though definitive critiques of
Positivism have since been published (Hopwood, 2007A, 2007B) Positivism
still reigns supreme in the mainstream literature, as evidenced, for
instance, my membership-numbers of the Financial Reporting Section of
the American Accounting Association, and its counterparts in the UK,
Canada, and Australia. These membership numbers dwarf those of other
sections. Doctoral programs -- that reproduce the faculty-base in North
America -- are staffed, overwhelmingly, with financial markets faculty who
espouse positivistic research. Notwithstanding withering intellectual
critiques of Positivism, this research program remains firmly entrenched.
The reason for Positivism's resilience is that 'truth' is no longer
settled by intellectual debates, but rather by the influence of commerce. As
early as 1847, Marx noted that, by 1830 intellectual tournaments had been
replaced by prizefighting -- that powerful economic interests determined
which doctrines prevailed. However even before the precarious intellectual
ferment of Marx's 17th and 18th Century England, commercial and
economic forces often held sway. Truths volunteered by Socrates,
Copernicus, Galileo and Hegel, were often extracted under duress (Stone,
1989; Benn, 1969). Ideas rarely 'faithfully represented' social reality
(Solomons, 1991, Tinker, 1991). Theorizing and understandings are inevitably
partial, not least because of the conditioning commercial forces.4 .
4

Adorno argues that social world always exceeds the ability of the societies intellectual
ability to comprehend it and so epistemology is always inexact (Adorno, 1973). Hegel's
famous remark that 'The Owl of Minerva only ascends at dusk' echoes the same
sentiment: that knowledge is always historical, and can never be present or prospective
(Hegel, 1977).

In the U.S, the material foundations of normative thinking lay with
Briloff's small accounting practitioners. Beginning in the 1970's, Briloff
launched a series of attacks on the large accounting firms and their
corporate clients (Briloff, 1972, 1981). Briloff's impact cannot be
overestimated: Stanford's George Foster has shown that Briloff's articles
affected stock prices and cost the Big 8's clients millions (Foster, 1987).
The normative theory of Briloff et al asserted that there were 'correct'
ways of measuring and reporting expenses, revenues, assets, and liabilities,
and that frequently corporate managers mis-reported these amounts.
Normative reasoning and deductive reasoning -- often backed by in-depth
case analysis -- was the modus operandi of normative researchers like
Edwards and Bell (1961), Chambers (1966), Sterling (1970) in arriving at what
"ought to" or "should" be done5. It was this idealistic character of normative
theorising that invited the criticism of positive researchers.
The positivist counteract was spearheaded by scholars from the
University of Chicago, and quickly spread to Rochester, Berkeley, Stanford,
Illinois, Texas, UCLA, NYU and many followers. This movement wasn't
spontaneous. The Big 8/7/6/5/4 and their corporate clients funded chairs,
often named after the firm or a corporate patron. They supplied generous
research grants and tied funding for faculty chairs in order to regulate
academic discourse. Significantly, by the mid 1990's, more than 50% of the
American Accounting Associations revenue came from sources other than
membership fees (Tinker, 2001).
Initially, the positivist critique took the form of arguing that researchers
need to understand "what is" and eschewed the normative trap of making
value judgements (Dopuch, 1980; Nelson, 1973, Dykman et al, 1985). Positive
researchers remained adamant that normative criticism, of the Brilovian

5

Ironically, positive and normative research shares the same theoretical orientation: income
theory -- a derivative of neoclassical economic theory. Normative research differs in that it
stresses that the divide between ownership and control (management) cannot be rectified by
market forces.

variety, was subjective, and little more that 'paid excuses' (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979).
Attempts to shut down the normative quest were particularly
opportune, as auditors were under attack for their role in a several takeover
and merger scandals (Barmash, 1973, Soble and Dallos, 1975). Positive
Accounting offered the firms and their clients academic sanctuary from the
barrage of public criticism. Positivists would argue that, given the theoretical
impossibility of distinguishing between correct and incorrect accounting
values, auditors were not liable for the financial debacles of the period. To
deflect public outrage, positivists researchers offered market studies as a
research palliative, where aggregate stock prices were tendered as the true
metric of corporate performance. But this measure failed to register the real
source of many financial failures and scandals -- insider trading where
insiders (usually managers) preyed on outsiders by manipulating stock
prices with accounting manipulations. The vast industry of positivist
research continues, to this day, to sideline critical investigations of
accounting frauds.
Positive research has never completely eclipsed normative criticisms
because of the ongoing parade of financial and audit crises. These scandals
involved massive wealth transfers between powerful sectors of the financial
community. Accounting facilitated these expropriations by fictitious earnings
reports that created stock price bubbles. National Student Marketing, Equity
Funding, Billie So Estes, Investors Overseas Services, Reliance Insurance,
ZZZZBest and Regina Vacuum Cleaner are all instances of inflating
accounting income to boost stock prices. This allowed takeovers by share
exchange using an overvalued share price as well as supporting handsome
management compensation schemes for insiders (Barmash, 1973, Soble and
Dallos, 1975).6 Wordcom and Enron later deployed the same tactics (Briloff,
1972; Tinker, 1985.)
6

These and others incidents eventually prompted congressional investigations led by
senators Moss and Metcalfe. Congress discovered that the then Big 8 accounting firms

The continuous dilution of regulatory, audit and disclosure
requirements, the weakening of normative accounting, and the rise of
Positive Accounting, have all contributed to a litany of financial crisis. The
recent practices of the big American banks (Citibank, Chase, Morgan Stanley,
Goldman Sachs) have up-scaled insider trading to a new high. In 1920-9, the
predecessors of Chase and Citi (National City, and Chase) perfected insider
trading by targeting single stocks under the guise of anonymous syndicates
(Galbraith, 1954). By the 1990's, the modern descendents of these banks,
armed with billions of dollars of pension funds, mutual funds, and unit trust
monies, bubble-blowed entire stock markets in Russia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic (Cooper, 2008, Gowan, 2009).7 Bubble-blowing was then
taken to the American heartland: the Dot.com bubble, the Real-Estate Bubble,
the Second Mortgage Bubble, and the Credit Card Bubble (Sy and Tinker,
forthcoming). The dominance of Positivism ensures that academe is neither
a watchdog nor a bloodhound in preventing these meltdowns.
Positive Accounting's efforts to dilute regulatory safeguards are
ubiquitous. The results have been catastrophic. KPMG's audits of New
Century Financial are now the object of a $1 billion law suit (Hughes, 2009).
New Century is probably a bellwether of a new parade of audit failures-ushered-in by the sub-prime fiasco. Positive Accounting has also obstructed
educational progress by preventing critical content from reaching the
curriculum of doctoral students and the undergraduates placed into their
custody. It is apocryphal that Professor Abraham Briloff was asked to 'stay
away' from his Baruch College faculty seminars because he upset the
positive accounting visitors.
Audits of the banks' internal control processes have also been
compromised, even though regulatory standards were installed by Sarbanescontrolled 95% of the audit market of Fortune 500 companies, and therefore had
disproportionate control over information that was released to the capital markets (U.S.
Congress, 1977a, 1976b).
7

Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sach's trading privileges were suspended by the
Hungarian authorities in 2009. These firms were using U.S. FDIC insured deposits to
engage in bubble-speculation involving that countries currency.

Oxley (SOX) as recently as 2002. SOX requires management to certify the
functionality of internal controls and auditors are mandated to certify
management compliance.8 Evidence of sub-prime lending practices
indicates a complete breakdown in compliance; even though the SEC and
PCAOB are empowered to apply penalties on auditors and management.9
The empiricist episteme underpinnings of Positive Accounting -- with
its focus on facts and data at the expense of social values -- stands in stark
contrast to a Post-Positivist philosophy. The latter denies the possibility of
transcendental facts; facts are always situated by values and are the
product of prevailing social beliefs and ideology. A succinct account of the
social specificity of Post-Positivist truth is given by Vic Allen:
. . . the ideas of Edmond Burke came in response to the challenge for
forces for democratization;
Adam Smith's thought constituted an important theoretical
justification of laissez-faire;
Marxism was an attempt to provide an explanation of the more
disturbing consequences of
capitalism; marginal analysis in economics was a counterblast to
Marxism; Weber's bureaucratic
theory was a rationalization and therefore a theoretical justification
of the contradictions
of large-scale German monopolies operating within an environment
of laissez-faire ideology;
Keynesian economics was an intellectual and pragmatic response to
the crisis of mass unemployment
and the inability of classical economics to locate the cause (Allen,
1975, p.72).
8

Many of these financial institutions have FDIC insured deposits. By engaging in
speculative activity (investment banking) they expose the public to the risk of default
(Cooper, 2008).
9
The marginalization of normative research is the latest episode in a 50 year struggle to rollback state regulation in favour of free market regulation. As a response to the speculative
excesses of the 1920-30's, Congress passed the 1933-4 Securities Acts that mandated the
form and content of prospectuses and financial reports, and directed that auditing be
conducted by independent CPA's. The SEC was originally charged with responsibility to set
accounting standards, but lobbying by the accounting industry and stock exchanges
ensured that the SEC was never properly funded. As a result, the SEC was forced to handover accounting standard-setting to the accounting industry (who to this day are still paid
by the entities they are charged to audit).

The case in favor of Positive Accounting and its derivative -Historical Archivalism -- is ably presented by Tyson and Oldroyd (2007).
This paper draws on Tyson and Oldroyd's work to present and test the
episteme of Archivalism. It seeks to discern the underlying aims of
archival history by showing how it camouflages its normative and political
agenda. We show how Archivalism distances itself from expressing its
own value judgments and opinions by ‘Consulting an Oracle’ (using the
voices of others to speak on its own behalf).

2. VALUE-FREE ARCHIVALISM
Tyson and Oldroyd (2007) provides a full-dress defense of
Archivalism against its critics (Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007, Sy and Tinker,
2005). To bolster the case for a fact-based, value-free archivalism, Tyson
and Oldroyd undertook a study of 176 articles that appeared in three peerreviewed journals. They deduce, from preliminary observations that
historians are not qualified to offer policy advice or recommendations:
“...that accounting historians ... [do not]... have the authority and are
they well situated to address problems in practice and theory today.
That undertaking is better left to social activists, contemporary
critics, an accounting regulators.... historians should continue to
examine, illuminate, and interpret the past” (Tyson and Oldroyd,
2007, p.184).
This argument in favor of political neutrality carries with it a corollary
of preserving the status quo. To stand apart from the political fray is to
defer to the extant institutional, political, social, and intellectual order.
However, to understand the grounds by which Tyson and Oldroyd arrive
this conclusions, and the extent to which it is possible to sustain this
position, it is necessary to scrutinize more closely their empirical study.
Tyson and Oldroyd's study involves making five initial
methodological choices: First, the choice of a data-set in the form of three
journals; second, the selection (and the exclusion) of articles from those
journals; third, the selection of a five-year window for framing the articles

studied; fourth, the limitation to examining abstracts-only and finally, the
formulation of the categories to which the articles were consigned. We
examine each in turn.

Sample-Selection
The three journals that formed the empirical base are “The
Accounting Historians Journal”, “Accounting History", and “Accounting
Business & Financial History”. This first step is not just an empirical act; it
involves a choice that itself must invoke a criterion by which some journals
have been included, and others are excluded. Missing, for instance, are
non-journal data from major conferences (celebrating for instance, Pacioli
(1984), Littleton (1933), Yamey (1964) and Sombart (Yamey, 1964) seminal
books and biographies, and historical works. The journals that are missing
include Accounting, Organizations and Society, ABACUS, Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal etc.10 Are the hypotheses of the study
intended to demonstrate the apolitical character of accounting history?
Are these hypotheses adequately tested by excluding such a mass of
authoritative material?
A sequence of methodological decisions were made in the Tyson
and Oldroyd study, but in each case, the process of choice is not
explained. By what criterion was a five year limit on papers studies
determined? Why five years? Similar concerns are prompted by the
decision to eliminate articles on “banking, insurance, valuation, and other
aspects of business history that are, IN OUR VIEW [authors’ emphasis]
only tangentially related to business history” (Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007,
p.184). To state that the exclusion is appropriate 'in our view' only begs the
question as to, 'What was the rationale to support the view?' The authors
10

There is a “commonsense reasonableness” to these five choices, however
commonsense alone is a poor foundation for adjudicating truth. "Commonsense" once
supported the notion that the World was flat, that some races were inferior because of
skin-color and their estrangement from Christ, that fairies inhabited the underworld and
that women in the Middle-Ages who administered herbal medicine were practitioners of
witchcraft.

are somewhat cognizant of their incomplete exposition of their process of
choice:
“We recognize that our classification scheme is artificial and
arbitrary” (Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007, p.185).... and
We recognize that other journals publish articles on accounting
history, but these journals do not specialize in accounting history”.
(op.cit. p.184).
The key part of the quotation in that the choice of journals was
limited to those that 'specialize in accounting history'. But this begs more
questions than it answers. What does 'specialization' mean? How might it
be measured? Why is it relevant anyway? Isn't ABACUS a 'specialized
journal? By what criterion is it excluded? Setting aside for a moment the
problems with the criterion of 'specialization', why aren't other criteria
considered? Why not, for instance, seek metrics of quality or size of
journal readership? Why not use circulation figures? Why not only use
accredited statistics? AOS and ABACUS are both ISI accredited; surely
this stature merits consideration? Beyond ISI, why not use Google
downloads or government rating exercises? Perhaps the stature of a
journal's publisher should be considered? 11 None of these options are
intended as recommendations for the research. The point is that choices
are made in virtually all archival studies, and these choices must invoke a
value criterion. It is never possible to resolve choices simply by struggling
with the facts. Facts must always be interpreted.
It is important to decipher the manner in which archivalists 'smugglein' value judgments into research. In this study, methodological choices
are simply parachuted into the empirics in an arbitrary manner. Opinion is
allowed to masquerade as fact. Other options are never discussed. To do
so would force the author’s to admit that they were engaged in a process of
choice, and that they were invoking their own values, their own norms and
11

Indeed, in terms of the criterion of a journals audience-reach, one if the journals
included in the Tyson and Ackroyd pantheon -- “The Accounting Historians Journal”--is
not even available on-line.

activism. If preferences are 'owned', then it would be possible to evaluate
the adequacy of choices; and identify biases -- however unintended.
Restricting sampling in seemingly arbitrary ways may -- perhaps
inadvertently -- generate the results one is seeking. To re-iterate, the
concern here is not with the politics implicit in archival research, but to
examine its internal contradictions and the manner in which they are
sustained. For, consider the assertion:
“...historians simply want to understand what happened in the past,
why things happened as they did... seek to understand the past for
its own stake” (Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007, p.181, p.184)
On the face of it, this is a seemingly unpretentious, innocent claim of
modesty for archival research. It is a promise to stick within the limits of
the facts and avoid politics and value- judgments. No doubt, many archival
researchers honestly believe that this is what they practice. However,
'motives', 'beliefs' and 'intent' are never sufficient, and can never be put
beyond critical examination. As the previous passages show, archival
research does not escape value-judgments. As the saying goes, 'The road
to Hell is paved with good intentions'.

Data Classification, Interpretation and implications of
the Empirical Analysis
For data classification and interpretation, this archival study offers
the following:
“...we reviewed the abstracts of 176 articles... and categorized them
according to five ‘criteria’ (sic) -- topic area(s), methodology, time
focus, geographic focus, and eclecticism” (Tyson and Oldryod, 2007,
p.184).
The authors present five categories for classifying the abstracts of
the papers examined: these topic (areas) are "Methodology", "Time Focus",
"Geographical Focus", and Eclecticism". The process for ‘birthing’ the

categories was essentially one of induction. By scrutinizing the data, the
five categories emerged.
It is probably beyond dispute that this process was essentially
subjective. There was no objective set of categories out-there, waiting to
be discovered. Different researchers are likely to 'bring-home' different
categorizations. In that sense, the process must be subjective. Subjectivity
is not, in-and-of-itself, a death-blow to a research study. However,
research is a collective enterprise in that researchers draw on past
literature, and seek to add to a collective understanding. Studies need to be
capable of being replicated, and therefore inter-subjective (Blalock, 1971).
Inter-subjectivity can be established by employing a variety of
methodological precautions. Unfortunately, in arriving at the five
categories in this study, none of the usual safeguards -- to preserve the
internal and external validity of the data -- were employed. For instance, to
protect against mere 'subjectivity', and to permit the replication of the
study by others, two or more independent researchers should have
separately processes the same data set, producing their own categories
and their own data assignments to their categories (Bunge, 1964; Blalock,
1971). The results from these independent efforts should then have been
compared using qualitative correlation tests, to gauge the degree of
agreement / disagreement. High correlations would provide some
assurance as to the robustness of the results across different researchers
and subjects. These methodological safeguards are appropriate because
the production of social, scientific knowledge is a public enterprise that
should allow researchers to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors to
add to the results. Without such precautions, the reliability and validity of
any results must be put in doubt.
The authors of the archival effort seemed aware of these concerns.
They admit to the “difficult and subjective aspect of our rubric”, yet
notwithstanding, there was no attempt to erect an inter-subjective firewall.
To the contrary:

‘...We revised the final breakdown through dialogue with the other author
.... we chose to place the article (sic) in a second or even third category as
near as need.... [Because] ...creating time boundaries [for articles] between
periods was problematic...one of the authors reviewed each abstract, made
the assignment, and consulted with the other author to resolve
uncertainties” ((Tyson and Oldryod, 2007, p185).
.
In short, rather than use independent tests and testers, the authors
forced agreement between themselves, thereby compromising the external
and internal validity of the study.
The next step in the archival study was to assign the abstracts to the
five categories according to their content. Even with agreement on the
categories, it is likely that researchers would differ in their assignment of
the abstracts. It is rare in this kind of research that any empirical content
would fit neatly into one category. Reality dictates that multiple
memberships would be the general rule, not the exception. However, the
authors -- presumably for convenience -- elected to force all abstracts into
one or other category -- multiple memberships were not allowed. For an
empirical study, the price of this 'convenience' is likely to be severe.
Forcing Reality into boxes to which it does not entirely belong may distort
the picture and therefore any inferences drawn there-from (Firstone and
Chadwick, 1975; Quine, 1980A; Bunge, 1964; Blalock, 1971). ,
Methodological caution is the hallmark of good, orthodox empiricalarchival research. It involves invoking a cautionary, skeptical aura.12
Unfortunately, these sentiments were not in evidence in this archival study.
Little effort was devoted to testing the validity of the core thesis of the text,
or questioning the underlying precepts of the research. Quite the contrary,
this study was predisposed towards affirmation. Rather than a healthy
skepticism, data and methods were forced towards preordained
conclusions.
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To this day, accountants continue to struggle to find tractable measures/ observations,
corresponding to concepts of profit, expense, executive compensation, etc. Indeed, there
is still no clear definition for some of these concepts.

The previous passages examined the empirical dimensions to this
'crucial experiment'. The next section examines the theoretical critique.
Here, Archivalism doesn't offer any theoretical base of its own, because
'theory' takes second-place to data and evidence in the archival notion of
truth. Nonetheless, archivalists have sought to rebut the post-positivist
critique of Archivalism, and do so by seeking to discredit Post-Positivist
philosophy.

3. THEORETICAL CRITIQUE: THE NEW ORACLES
Post-Positivism is the antithesis of Archivalism in that it treats all
facts -- and thus all history -- as theoretical constituted. There are no
neutral or objective positions; history is always (re) constructed from a
particular perspective. Values, opinions and subjectivity predicate postpositivist research (Held, 1980; Adorno, 1973, 1979). There are no
transcendental truths in this philosophy; truth is always relative to time
and place (Allen, 1975, Held, 1980).
In order to critique Post-Positivism, Archivalism must overcome an
internal contradiction. If opinions and value-judgments a banished from
any archivalist discourse, then it must find a method of expressing a
critical opinion -- a judgment -- without expressing an opinion or a
judgment! Tyson and Oldroyd resolve the dilemma by drawing on
secondary sources to critique the Post-Positivist (Post-Kuhnian) research
(Kuhn, 1962).13 The practice is not dissimilar to the method used by the
Ancient Greeks who traveled to Delphi to consult the Oracle when faced
with major quandaries. Tyson and Oldroyd consult three oracles to mount
their critique: Bryer (2006A, 2006B) Harris (1992), Laudan (1996). We
13

This is not the place to provide a full re-statement of the defense of Post-Kuhnian
research. This is detailed in Sy and Tinker (2005). In summary, Post-Kuhnian (PostPositivist) contents that data never ‘speaks for itself’ but must always be interpreted, and
thus archival research constructs truth and re-present facts. Second, all quests for transhistorical truths are destined to fail. What is ‘true’ is always contingent on a time and
place in history. Post-Kuhnian research aims to develop a notion of ‘truth’ that recognizes
its socially relative nature and show how truth changes and therefore, how it is possible to
transcend the present with a “new” standard of truth (Held, 1980).

consider the each oracle and then return to whether this practice -- of
consulting an oracle -- is consistent with archivalist practice.

The New Oracles
1. Bryer (2006A, 2006B)
“...Kuhn’s belief that law, theory, application, and instrumentation...
cannot be separated...” (Bryer, 2006, p.552).
Bryer's criticism above of Post-Positivism is a very important one,
but it requires further elucidation. When empirical evidence is collected, it
always reflects on two, not one, theory. First, a theory of observation about
how, for instance, an electron microscope, a telescope, or a questionnaire
works. When a researcher observes the results of a questionnaire, s/he is
hypothesizing that the questionnaire itself is giving results that mean what
it is taken to mean (Sy and Tinker, 2005, p.52; Firestone an Chadwick, 1975,
Quine, 1980B). For instance, consciously or otherwise, the researcher
hypothesizes that the check-marks on the questionnaire a good-faith
report. Implicitly, s/he is also hypothesizing that they are not a coffee
stain, an act of sabotage by an angry respondent, or some other
explanation. By accepting the results as good-faith reports, the researcher
is forming, testing, and accepting a hypothesis, and rejecting a type-two
explanation / hypothesis (of coffee stains, sabotage etc). S/he is always
testing an observation theory.
The same evidence also tests a second hypothesis; that belonging to
the theory of real interest. This theory might concern, for example, the
theory as to the cause of planetary movements or to the factors creating
employee loyalty. The problem is that evidence is always filtered by
measuring instruments (eyes, questionnaires, electron microscopes).
Thus it is impossible to know whether the results are a commentary on the
validity of the measuring instrument or on the theory under examination.
Bryer's important point is that because two theories are always in play (the

extant theory and an observation theory) it is impossible to disentangle the
evidence to know to which theory it applies. Does it refute/ affirm the extant
theory, the measurement theory, both, or neither? Hence, for Bryer, truth
can never be established unequivocally with evidence by post-positive
research.
An example of the dilemma posed by Bryer (and therefore, Tyson
and Oldroyd) is in Barnes (1982). Barnes notes that the planet Uranus
remained ‘undiscovered’ for months, because the electrical impulses
registering on a printout were interpreted as ink smudges. Uranus was
eventually 'discovered' when researchers began to suspect the correlation
of the smudges on printouts over time. The problem lay in the
inseparability of the observation theory (reading the printout) and the
theory of astronomy. While there are ways of minimizing measuring
instrument errors, they are difficult to eradicate, and it is impossible
disentangle empirical results of the observation theory and extant theory.
Bryer (Tyson and Oldroyd) are on strong grounds in their case against
Post-Positivism's reliance on evidence.
Ironically, Tyson and Oldroyd's own siren may augur more trouble
for the Archivalism than for its adversary: Post-Positivism. Archivalism's
notion of truth is exclusively evidential; it depends totally on facts.
Therefore Bryer's indictment is far more lethal for Archivalism than for its
Post-Positivist contender. For Post-Positivism, truth only partially relies on
evidence; it also admits logical and theoretical sources for validation
(Kuhn, 1970). Furthermore, archivalists frequently aspire to a much more
ambitious notion of truth than post-positivists. Some achivalists believe
that, just by heaping on more-and-more facts, a final truth may eventually
will-out (Harris, 1992). The hurdle for truth for Post-Positivism is more
modest that that of Archivalism. Post-Positivism only seeks to establish

social truth; what is true at a particular time and place in history. (Allen,
1975, Held, 1980).14
2. Harris (1992).
In a similar oracle-like consultation, Harris (1992) is summoned by
Tyson and Oldroyd to offer a solution for choosing between competing
theories. Harris' proposal below bears a strong resemblance to a crucial
experiment. So Tyson and Oldroyd, (2007, p. 177) Notes that, “Harris ...
proposes a different solution to resolve intellectual debates, one that most
archival historians would readily embrace.”
Harris’ solution is as follows:
“In anything is going to resolve the dispute between competing
theories it will be the accumulation of more data through
experiments by more researchers over a longer period of time.”
(Harris, 1992, quoted in Tyson and Oldroyd, 2007, p. 177).
Importantly, this takes Archivalism beyond a neutral description -- to
a higher and much more ambitious realm --of adjudication between
theories as to their relative truth. In this regard, Tyson and Oldroyd are
decidedly remiss in terms of there acquaintance with relevant literature.
Karl Popper was probably one of the greatest proponents of Empiricism;
yet there is no examination of Popper's philosophical remonstrations in
Tyson and Oldroyd (Popper, 1968, 1970). The kind of empiricism proposed
by Harris (1992) is a form of confirmationism or induction. A review of
Poppers' works -- beginning with the first edition (1957) of THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1968, p.45-51) -- shows that no amount of factdigging can prove a hypothesis (Popper, 1968). Popper's alternative -- that
disproof or refutation of theories -- is the only tenable episteme, rebuts the
14

One further irony is that the more modest position of post-positivists put them closer to
that arch-empiricist, Karl Popper, than archivalists. Popper, one of the legendary
advocates of empiricism, has maintained that theories can never be proved, but only
refuted. His position on refutation has be subsequently weakened as a result of debates
with Kuhn, Lakatos, and Adorno (Frisby, 1976, Lakatos and Musgrave 1970).

case for induction-based empiricism. Popper proposes refutation as the
only tenable philosophical position.
But Popper's refutation isn't Archivalism's the Holy Grail. Popper
has retreated from a strong refutation position as a result of criticisms from
Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyebend, Adorno and others (Feyerabend, 1969, 1973).
These writers underscored the difficulties of refuting a theory. Their
objections focus on the unclear rules of correspondence (the fuzzy
relationship between theoretical terms and observational terms) the
ambiguities created by the simultaneous double-testing of observation and
extant theories, and the incommensurability of scientific theories.
Historians also insisted that the past record of scientific change shows that
science has never progressed by refutation, but by the formation and
reformation of paradigms -- paridigmatic shifts. A scientific revolution /
paradigm overthrow was the exception, not the rule (Feyerabend, 1969,
1973, Kuhn, 1962, 1970; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970).
Tyson and Oldroyd cannot avoid responsibility for their citation of
the opinions expressed by their anointed oracle (Harris, 1992). Whatever
the quality of Harris' analysis, it is important to know how and why Harris
was selected. Many distinguished defenders of the Empiricism /
Archivalism were passed over by Tyson and Oldroyd. The works of these
writers would have greatly enriched the philosophical foundations of Tyson
and Oldroyd's Archivalism, but their works lead to the unwelcome
conclusion for Archivalism: that values -- not just facts -- guided the oracleadoption process.
3. Laudan (1996).
Speaking through a new oracle (Laudan, 1996) Tyson and Oldroyd
note that:
Laudan views post-positivism as, “... an intellectual failure. The
argument on its behalf are dubious and question-begging. Still
worse, it has sustained no positive program of research... and that it

now teeters on the brink of conceptual bankruptcy.” Tyson and
Oldroyd, 2007, pp.178).
Laudan's death-sentence pronounced on Post-Positivism is
delivered without evidential support. Indeed, the assessment of
"Conceptual Bankruptcy'" fails to square with the evidence. There are
several thriving journals serving the post-positivist field: Organisation
Studies, Situations, and Social Text. Even in accounting, the journal
Accounting, Organizations and Society has been in the vanguard of
promoting post-positivist research; notably regarding the works of Michele
Foucault. A cursory scan of the accounting publications shows that postpositivist research is alive and well. Many accounting writers exemplify
different variants of this research program: Pat Arnold, Stanley Aronowitz,
Ed Arrington, Gerry Hanlon, Stefano Harney, Jim Haslam, Anthony
Hopwood, Keith Hoskin, Sonja Galhoffer, Cheryl Lehman, Ray Loveridge,
Norman MacIntosh, Richard Macve, Randy Martin, Alan McKinlay, Barbara
Merino, Roland Monroe, Frank Mueller, Bertell Ollman, Vaughan Radcliffe,
Michael Rosen, and Mick Rowlinson, etc.15
Laudan raises a second problem for post-positivism. Tyson and
Oldroyd (2007, p.178) quoting Laudan:
"....[The incommensurability critique of Empiricism by postarchivalists] ...has been a philosophical conundrum in search of
instantiation. Neither Kuhn or Feyerbend present any evidence that
natural scientists on opposite sides of the theoretical fence
systematically failed to understand one another, as the thesis of
incommensurability requires”.
Laudan's observation is puzzling. Kuhn, Adorno, Lakatos,
Masterson, and Feyerbend provide several examples of '... evidence that
natural scientists on opposite sides of the theoretical fence systematically
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This is not to assert that all these writers are in complete unanimity about everything;
they do share however a skepticism about empiricism and the importance of recognizing
the institutional / social production of knowledge.

failed to understand one another, as the thesis of incommensurability
requires” (Adorno, et. al, 1976, Feyerabend, 1969, 1973, Frisby, 1976;
Popper, 1968;Lakatos, 1970; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Kuhn et. al,
cite, for instance, the Catholic Church's theory, placing the Earth (and
'man') at the centre of the Universe. This theory was quite irreconcilable
with Galileo's theory of planetary motion.16 The theories of Copernicus and
Ptolemy drew on quite different and incommensurable explanatory
systems, and therefore they both co-existed for several decades.
Scientific theories, like history, are not like mathematical theories,
where it is often possible to lay one mathematical theory side-by-side
against another. Two mathematical theories can be represented as a series
of theorems, axioms, and / or equations. Each can then be compared with
the other to identify the one with illogical premises and contradictions.
Non-mathematical theories are not structured and organized with the same
exactness as mathematical theories; they do not share their clarity and
precision. The rules of correspondence of non-mathematical theories are
often fuzzy. This is as true, not just for the natural sciences and physics,
but also for social sciences like history and accounting -- the territory of
Tyson, Oldroyd, and Laudan. For this reason, these theories do indeed
'systematically fail to understand one another'; they are incommensurable
and this is the general case.
By the same token, Einsteinium and Newtonian theories of gravity
and planetary motion remained unresolved for years because they drew on
quite different rationales. Ptolemy's navigational charts remained in force
for over 50 years after Copernicus announced his new system. Einstein's
followers waited for decades for Arthur Eddington's opportunity to visit the
South Seas to witness a rare eclipse. A 'crucial experiment' is only possible
16

Karl Popper provided a 'line of demarcation' to separate science from non-science
(Popper, 1957). To qualify as a science, a theory must be refutable. This excluded
religious beliefs, Marxism and History from Popper's realm of science. Philosophies such
as Post-Positivism have re-admitted values into the scientific realm and in response, the
Popperian exclusion of religion has been weakened. Hence, today, religious beliefs are a
powerful influence in some sciences.

when two theories are sufficiently commensurable to permit testable
predictions. Even then, empirical opportunities for testing the prediction
may be quite rare. Such opportunities for commensurability and testing
are unusual occurrences --incommensurability is the general case (Ravetz,
1973; Baritz, 1980).17
Notwithstanding questions as to the veracity of Lauden's claims,
Lauden presents Tyson and Oldroyd with the same self-contradictory
conundrum as that presented previously. Like Harris, Laudan work isn’t a
peer-reviewed publication but book from an obscure publisher. A peerreviewed oracle might have alerted Tyson and Oldroyd to the literary
oversights noted previously. Equally important: the absence of discussion
as to the selection of the Lauden-Oracle perpetuates the archival fallacy of
value-free analysis.

4. IMPLICATIONS
This study has grasped the rare opportunity to conduct something
akin to a crucial experiment to assess the relative efficacy of Positivism /
Archivalism and Post-Positivism. The former has dominated mainstream
accounting research for some 25 years. The authority of Positivism in
accounting has provided a mandate to Archivalism in accounting history.
In this sense, Positivism has extended to accounting history its mandate of
objectivity and a-politicization, and the corollaries of anti-criticism and
endorsement of the status quo.
Tyson and Oldroyd provide an excellent defense of Archivalism and
therefore Positivism in general. The difficulties facing these authors
should not be underestimated; nor should it be forgotten that Positivism
and Archivalism still reigns supreme -- these beliefs are de rigueur for
mainstream accounting research. This 'unpleasant truth' for critical
researchers is a reminder of the importance of repeatedly challenging
17

Karl Popper acknowledges the impossibility of “proving” a hypothesis, because it would
require that sampling is always inconclusive because “proof” requires that we also
sample all cases in the past, present, and future (Popper, 1968).

Positivism at every opportunity. There is a temptation for critical
researchers to retreat into a self-affirming cocoon, comforted by the
knowledge that they won the intellectual battle. But 'theory' is more than
just an intellectual question; it is also a social product and therefore the
'World of Ideas' will never accomplish a final closure. Hence, Tyson and
Oldroyd have provided an invaluable opportunity to maintain the ongoing
interrogation of these social beliefs.
The framework of a crucial experiment gives this paper a singular
occasion for interrogating Archivalism. Tyson and Oldroyd offer a defense
of Archivalism and critique of Post-Positivism that is both theoretical and
empirical. This paper provides a sympathetic rendering of Tyson and
Oldroyd's arguments, and a counter-critique of the theoretical and
empirical components of their case. The counter-critique shows that,
although Archivalism seeks to disguise its normative underpinnings, it is
unable to escape from its own value judgments. The primary tactic that
archivalists deploy is to disown their value judgments by ‘Consulting an
Oracle’ -- using the voices-of-others to promote subterranean opinions and
normative stances. This paper concludes that Positivism and Archivalism
can never be apolitical, neutral or value free. They always proffer a political
agenda -- acknowledged or otherwise. 18

18

In accounting history, the preservation of the status-quo ranges from closetEurocentricism to Great-Men" theories of history. These topics are not the subject of this
paper, but has been discussed elsewhere (Sy and Tinker, forthcoming).
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